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Abstract 
 While much literature on the Internet has drawn heavily on the ideas of normalization or 
optimism, this article seeks to define a more complex relationship between existing political 
institutions and new technology. With reference to the development of campaign finance 
strategies in the US and the UK, it will aim to show that existing political circumstances and 
technology share a dialectic relationship when it comes to generating outcomes. The success 
of online fundraising in the US is certainly reforming political life, but is the product of long-
standing arrangements and beliefs which have catalyzed its impact. In contrast, in the United 
Kingdom institutional arrangements have retarded the potential of the Web in this area.   
Keywords: campaigns, elections, fundraising, online politics, United Kingdom, United States  
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The analysis of any new technological phenomena invariably raises the question of 
ontological primacy, and in particular the distinction between technological and sociological 
determinism. The development of the Internet and the ramifications it has for political 
competition are no exception to this rule. Two distinct camps – the “optimists” and the 
“normalisers” – have emerged as the contemporary standard bearers for technological and 
sociological determinism respectively. The optimists focus on the technological attributes of 
the Internet, in particular how it lowers barriers to participation and democratizes both access 
to information and the means of creating it. They assume that the characteristics of the 
Internet will lead to a reformation in political activity, sidelining existing elites and 
empowering those who are currently excluded from civic life (Morris, 1999; Rushkoff, 2003; 
Trippi, 2004). In contrast, normalisers argue that the Internet will not herald a major 
rearrangement of power and opportunity away from existing political elites. Instead they 
claim those who currently control political life will be able to use their offline strengths to 
dominate the online world too (Margolis & Resnick, 2000; Norris, 2003; Resnick, 1998). 
Essentially the normalisers reverse the relationship that optimists perceive. The optimists 
believe that more equalitarian power structures will be created online and then come to impact 
offline politics. In contrast normalisers argue that, no matter what characteristics the Internet 
has, they will be subsumed into offline social and power arrangements.  
However, many studies have observed that the realities of online politics do not fit 
neatly into either the optimistic or the normalizing worldview (Gibson et al., 2005; 
Livingstone et al., 2005; Lusoli & Ward, 2005). These authors’ findings point to a more 
nuanced reality and a far more complex relationship between new communication technology 
and the offline world. It seems far more likely that the development of Internet politics is 
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being fuelled by a dialectic relationship, as both new technological affordances, and existing 
social and institutional arrangements mesh together to form unique and what must, by 
definition, be society specific outcomes (Anstead & Chadwick, 2008 - forthcoming). In short, 
the Internet certainly has the capability to change political life. However, it cannot escape the 
circumstances in which it is deployed, which can either catalyze or retard its potential. 
The aim of this article will be to attempt to understand this relationship in the context 
of a specific example – the use of the Internet as a tool for political fundraising. In order to do 
this, it will focus on two countries where the Internet has had a hugely differing level of 
impact, the United States and the United Kingdom, and seek to explain how the specific 
historical, institutional and regulatory attributes of each political system have led to such 
distinct outcomes, as well as assessing the changes that the Internet is driving. With this 
approach it will be possible to arrive at a truer understanding of the technological-societal 
dialectic.  
Fundraising Online in the US and the UK 
In the United States, the impact of Internet fundraising has been one of the major 
political changes in recent years, and would seem to support the view that the Internet is 
capable of having a revolutionary impact. With reference to the American experience, we can 
observe at least four clear developments which the net is driving. Firstly, the Internet has 
played a significant role during a period of time when the total sums of money expended in 
American politics have increased hugely. It has been argued, for example, that the 2008 
presidential election will become the first billion dollar contest (Malbin & Cain, 2007: 4). 
This sum would be more than double the totals contributed to candidates in 2004, and three 
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times the amount raised in 2000 (Campaign Finance Institute, 2008). Secondly, the new 
technology seems to have re-balanced political competition, aiding those who might be 
termed “outsider” candidates during primary competitions, at the expense of more established 
figures. Examples of this pattern include John McCain’s efforts in 2000, Howard Dean’s run 
in 2004, and Barack Obama and Ron Paul’s successes in 2008 (Bosman, 2007; Dodson & 
Hammersley, 2003; Klotz, 2004; Schouten, 2006; Spark-Smith, 2007; Trippi, 2004). Thirdly, 
the Internet is re-structuring the financial relationships between the parties. At least in recent 
history, the Democrats have been at a financial disadvantage against their Republican 
opponents. This was never more the case than during the 2000 election, when George W. 
Bush was nearly able to outspend Al Gore twice over. However, in 2004, John Kerry came 
close to achieving financial parity with Bush, largely thanks to his prowess as an Internet 
fundraiser (Dwyer et al., 2004). Fourthly, the Internet seems to be reshaping where political 
money is coming from. It has been claimed that, in the past, candidates and parties have 
tended to rely on large donations from a very small number of wealthy givers. The 
development of the Internet, it is argued, has created a form of “small dollar democracy”, 
where vast numbers of contributors, each donating comparatively small sums of money, can 
wield huge influence (Bonin, 2007; Graf et al., 2006; Helman, 2007; Trippi, 2004).  
These observations raise a whole host of research questions about the impact that the 
Internet is having on American political life, such as whether the financial arms race will 
continue into future election cycles; if party elites will be washed away by the continuing 
success of outsider candidates; and why do the Democrats seem to have an advantage online? 
However, one point is close to unarguable – the fundraising potential of the Internet is having 
a profound impact on American political life.   
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In contrast, it is almost impossible to find comparable examples of the Internet being 
a significant fundraising tool in the United Kingdom (Jackson, 2006: 158). One example that 
stands out, if only because it is relatively unique, are a series of emails sent by Labour-
supporting journalist and author John O’Farrell during the course of the 2005 general election. 
Within a few hours these had raised some £50,000. Over the next few days, the appeal went 
on to generate a total of £110,000 (O'Farrell, 2007). However, in the general scheme of an 
election where the party spent £17 million, the money raised by O’Farrell through his online 
donations drive was relatively minimal. Furthermore, it was not a strategy which other parties 
aimed to emulate over the course of the campaign (Jackson, 2006: 175) 
This is not to suggest that British parties have neglected the fundraising potential of 
the  Web altogether. All the major British parties, as well as a large number of the minor ones, 
do currently have donate buttons on their national  Web site (Jackson, 2006: 169). However, 
the relatively weak design of the sites, which have a tendency to be garish and unenticing 
(Nielson, 2008), and the low emphasis placed on fundraising, at least in comparison with the 
US, is indicative of an activity that is not central to parties’  Web strategies and where little 
success has been achieved. It is certainly the case that online fundraising in the UK has 
generated far less popular interest than it has in the US.  
It cannot be argued that the lack of donations to political parties and candidates from 
British citizens is part of a wider mistrust of financial transactions online. In the UK, 60 per 
cent of people have engaged in some form of e-commerce (Office of National Statistics, 
2006), lagging only slightly behind the 66 per cent of Americans who shop online (Horrigan, 
2008). Although consumer and political financial transactions are not directly analogous, 
there are some parallels. After all, many of the advantages of the Internet that make it perfect 
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for commerce – ease of use, convenience, rapidity of transaction, and the potential for low 
overheads – also make it ideally suited for political fundraising. For this reason, it is 
surprising that British politicians have made no headway in emulating their American 
counterparts. Furthermore, this difference between the British and the American experience 
cannot be explained through divergent levels of Internet adoption. In 2006, 69 out of every 
hundred Americans used the Internet, in comparison with 56 per cent of people in the United 
Kingdom (ITU, 2006). While these figures do show a digital divide between the two 
countries, it is also worth noting that the Internet was having a significant impact on political 
fundraising in the US before it achieved these levels of penetration. In 2003, for example, at 
exactly the point when Howard Dean was successfully using the Internet to fuel his candidacy 
for the Democratic nomination, 56 per cent of Americans were online – a figure identical to 
current British connectivity (ITU, 2003). 
The British experience suggests that it would be wrong to see the Internet as 
inherently linked to either colossal fundraising or small dollar democracy. This is one area of 
political life therefore where we are unlikely to find a process of Americanization occurring 
(Kavanagh, 1995). What seems more appropriate is to note that the technological affordances 
of the Internet, when coupled with certain aspects of the American political system, have 
demonstrated the potential to create very dramatic outcomes. In contrast, it seems that the 
environment in which British financial politics occurs is preventing the same technology 
having a comparable effect.  
Explaining the Differences 
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Attempting to explain the differing impact the Internet has had on fundraising in the 
US and the UK requires us to adopt a two part explanatory structure. First order explanations 
are to be found in foundational elements of the political systems in the two countries – 
essentially the realm of political ideas and long-standing institutional norms. These 
explanations are vital, as they frame the ideals and desires of both the political classes and 
citizens. As a result, they also play a huge role in constructing the narrative through which 
political events and developments are understood. Second order explanations fall into the 
arena we might term regulatory and legislative. Institutions have the potential to act as both 
catalysts and barriers, and thus influence the strategies that political actors adopt to achieve 
their goals.  
Foundational Explanations 
American and British politics, despite similarities and much-shared heritage, clearly 
contain many differing traditions. In the case of the US, two particular foundational 
circumstances have undoubtedly been essential to fuelling the development of online 
fundraising in the form in which it has occurred – civic volunteerism and progressivism. 
Civic volunteerism, defined as willingness to engage in active citizenship through 
offering time and support for causes and organizations, has been central to American life 
since the early years of the Republic, as de Tocqueville and Bryce both noted (Bryce, 1888; 
Tocqueville, 1988). More recent studies have argued that Americans continue to have a higher 
propensity to be civically involved than their counterparts in other countries (Almond & 
Verba, 1963; Curtis et al., 1992). In the context of campaign finance, the American tradition 
of civic volunteerism is distinct from either the British tradition of the mass membership party 
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or the European approach of state funding (Fisher & Clift, 2004: 683; Linton, 1994: chapter 
3), instead being based on the idea of contributing to the civic good. This leads to a very high 
proportion of Americans giving money during election cycles, at least in comparison with 
those in other countries (Sorauf, 1992: 1). This tradition of supporting candidates and parties 
with donations demarks one of the most distinctive elements of the American campaign 
finance system, and has been essential to the relationship that has developed between Internet 
technology and political finance.   
Forged at the beginning of the twentieth century, the American progressive tradition 
has also played a vital role in shaping the environment in which online fundraising has 
occurred. The concept of progressivism is notoriously hard to define, with it even being 
debated whether it is possible to talk about a progressive ideology or era. This is due to the 
various, and occasionally contradictory, ideas the tradition drew upon (Filene, 1970). 
However, progressivism can be defined with reference to two concepts, which continue to 
reverberate in American politics. Firstly, its adherence to political optimism based on a belief 
in the power of activism (Hofstadter, 1955). Secondly, progressives argued that there were 
inherent dangers when elites controlled large concentrations of wealth and power. To realize 
their goals therefore, progressives sought to devolve political power directly to citizens, 
through institutions such as the direct primary and the recall election, which gave the 
populace far greater control over office holders (Milkis & Mileur, 1999: 6-8). These twin 
pillars of progressivism have become recurring elements in American politics, especially at 
times when the political classes have been mistrusted. Most notably, this occurred in the post-
Vietnam period, when the role of the direct primary was hugely expanded in an effort to give 
the electorate a far greater impact on political outcomes (Finer, 1984). The rise of Internet 
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politics, and in particular the development of online fundraising strategies, can clearly be seen 
to fit into this tradition. Two aspects of Internet fundraising standout as having especial 
significance when viewed through the progressive prism.  
Firstly, activism seems to play a central element in online fundraising. Speaking at a 
seminar in February 2004 former Dean campaign manager Zaphyr Teachout argued the 
involvement of activists had played a vital role in Dean’s success in generating income online 
(Malbin et al., 2004). This argument was also later made by Republican political consultant 
Patrick Ruffini, who, citing the example of Howard Dean and Ron Paul’s campaigns, claimed 
that the most effective Internet fundraising occurs when candidates are surrounded by 
“vibrant grassroots ecosystems”, especially when these networks are based on blogs and 
many-to-many communication (Ruffini, 2007).   
Ruffini’s argument leads us to a second similarity between modern Internet 
fundraising and progressive ideology – a widespread belief that the Internet is removing 
power from old monied elites who have dominated political finance by virtue of their wealth. 
This change is most evidenced in the idea of “small dollar democracy” (Bonin, 2007; Graf et 
al., 2006). Howard Dean’s campaign in particular was noted for the very large number of 
donations it received of less than $200 (the largest amount that doesn’t have to be individually 
itemized to the Federal Election Commission). The historical context and tradition of 
progressivism offers an explanation as to why people believe that such a development would 
be healthy for American democracy.  
The central point to understand here is that in recent electoral contests, and especially 
those that have occurred since 2004, the Internet and its ability to help candidates raise 
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financial contributions has become more than a convenient mechanism for quickly and 
efficiently raising revenue to compete with opponents. Additionally, the role played by the 
Internet has been assimilated into the much wider traditions of civic volunteerism and 
progressivism within American politics.  
In contrast, in Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century, when American 
progressivism was at its zenith, alternative political principles were being developed and 
enshrined which were to have an equally long-standing impact and continue to influence 
modern fundraising strategies. In particular, the foundation and early development of the 
Labour Party embodied two particular ideals that were to have lasting ramifications on the 
British political landscape – the desirability of a role of trade unions in political life and a 
preference for mass membership parties. These arrangements offer an alternative to the more 
volunteer-orientated, donation-driven model of American campaign finance. 
The Labour Party was founded for the purpose of achieving working class 
representation in the House of Commons and the majority of the impetus for its creation came 
from the trade union movement, with the aid of a number of socialist societies (Garner & 
Kelly, 1998). At its foundation, the party sought to mobilize the financial muscle of the 
working classes, through the unions, in order to give it the ability to compete with older, 
cadre-style parties. However, in order for the potential of the union link to be realized, Labour 
first had to overcome a serious legal challenge. This occurred in 1909, when the House of 
Lords ruled that a railway porter, Walter Victor Osborne, should not be compelled to support 
the party simply because he was a member of an affiliate, the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Workers. The implications for Labour were huge, having the potential to strangle it 
at birth. It was only in 1913, when the Liberal government passed the Trade Unions Act, that 
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a compromise was reached. The Labour Party would be free to continue receive trade union 
donations. However, unions would have to stage a ballot among their membership in order to 
gain permission to donate to a political party (Klarman, 1989; Pelling, 1982).  
The rules created by these political skirmishes in the early twentieth century have 
largely remained in place to the present day, with one major amendment, which insisted that 
unions ballot their membership on political contributions every decade, being passed in 1984 
(Towers, 1989). The defeat of the arguments contained in the Osborne Judgment and the 
passing of the 1913 Act successfully enshrined a central element of the British campaign 
finance system. It did much to shape the nature of the trade union link and encouraged Labour 
to adopt a strongly collectivist approach to political organization, certainly in comparison with 
the then dominant Liberal party (Klarman, 1989: 895 and 899). Instead of donations 
positively being given by individuals, trade unions gave block grants to Labour from their 
political funds. The defining characteristic of the attitude many union members held to 
political donations was, in reality, apathy (Klarman, 1989: 913-914). 
Additionally, the 1913 Act and the rise of the Labour Party defined the modern party 
system and drew the financial battle lines of twentieth century British politics, forcing the 
Conservatives to rely increasingly on support from the business community to fulfill their 
financial needs and counterbalance the resources Labour received from unions. Through 
successfully employing these methods, they were able to compete with and even outstrip the 
financial capabilities of Labour (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981: chapters 4 and 5). The respective 
sources of support for the two major parties also bolstered the ideological conflict between 
them, with Labour seen as being dominated by the unions and the Conservatives argued to be 
under the control of a business elite. Through political competition then, the involvement of 
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organized labor and business in British political life became a firmly established practice. The 
real losers in this new arrangement, which continued for much of the twentieth century and, to 
a great extent, still continues, were the Liberals and their successor parties. Lacking 
institutional support, they rapidly became the poor relations of British politics (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1981: chapter 7).   
The second great engine of political finance established by both the left and right in 
the early twentieth century was the mass-membership party. This model of political 
organization had profound implications for the way parties were funded and, as importantly, 
how it was believed they should be funded. An inherent element of the structure of the mass 
membership party is the subscription, which offers an alternative to donations. This financial 
arrangement could be considered a more significant relationship between organization and 
supporter than is created by a simple donations system (Duverger, 1964). A subscription 
demonstrates a much more permanent affiliation between giver and receiver, as well as 
implying a greater level of commitment to the ideology of the party or the class whose 
interests it articulates. In return, subscribers can expect to reap the full benefits of 
membership, whether they are solidary, purposive or ideological (Ware, 1996: 69-71).  
In common with other western countries in which parties have formal structures for 
subscription, British parties have, in recent decades, suffered a dramatic decline in 
membership (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Webb, 2000). However, subscribers are still used 
to raise substantial sums of money. In 2005, for example, Labour was able to draw £3.5 
million from its membership, which amounted to a significant proportion of the £17 million 
of electoral expenses the party incurred in the same year (Electoral Commission, 2006). 
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This reliance on the century old model of the membership party has at least two 
impacts on British parties and their potential as online fundraisers. Firstly, by creating a more 
permanent relationship with their supporters, British parties are also effectively erecting a 
barrier to political donations, as it makes it highly unlikely that non-members will give 
(Jackson, 2006: 164). Secondly, the guarantee of significant – if declining – sums from the 
party membership offers an alternative revenue stream to donated monies. As a result, it is 
hardly surprising that much of the online work done by British parties has focused not on 
reaching out to new donors, but on engaging with their existing membership (Gibson et al., 
2005). This relationship and its solidity is especially important, as membership-based parties 
require far more permanent organizational arrangements, which have to be paid for 
throughout the duration of a parliament. This need has historically differentiated British 
parties from their election-focused American counterparts, and goes some way to explaining 
the persisting desirability of a membership-base, as it offers a constant stream of revenue 
which is less likely to fluctuate.  
Although they shared common concerns about political finance (most notably the 
power of elite and moneyed interests), the ideologies that developed in the US and the UK in 
response to these worries at the start of the twentieth century were distinct. In the US, the 
long-standing tradition of civic volunteerism, coupled with progressive ideas sought to bypass 
the power of political and economic elites. In contrast, in the UK, collectivism and unified 
class action was designated the most effective response, evident both in the trade union link 
and mass membership parties. However, a necessary by-product of these ideas (and the 
successful responses to them by the Conservative Party) was the development of political 
arrangements that downplayed the role of the individual in political life. This was to have 
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huge ramifications into the present day, as these foundational circumstances have created a 
form of path dependency, leading to contemporary outcomes (Fisher & Clift, 2004: 680). 
Ultimately, then, they play a huge role in the nature and success of online fundraising across 
differing societies.   
Regulatory and Legislative Explanations 
Historically, on both sides of the Atlantic, regulation and the passing of legislation on 
campaign finance has proved a particularly fraught and controversial area of discussion, with 
campaign finance reform a notoriously difficult area to legislate in. This should not surprise 
us; after all, campaign finance is an area of civic activity that is regulated by the very same 
people whose livelihoods and ambitions are to be most impacted by it – namely, office-
seeking politicians. This has, at various times during American and British history, led to 
periods where campaign finance has been hotly debated, but little action has been taken, with 
deadlock being the only outcome. It is no coincidence that when reforms have been 
implemented, it has followed events that have shaken the public’s confidence in the political 
classes.  
The Development of the Campaign Finance Regulation in the US 
One important consequence of the progressive tradition in American politics was a 
desire to legislate on campaign finance issues by those with a reformist agenda, among whom 
there was a belief that the problems of campaign finance could be solved through regulatory 
mechanisms. For this reason, campaign finance was a much more significant legislative issue 
in the US than it ever was in the UK.  
The progressive era. 
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Genuine attempts to offer root and branch reform of the campaign finance system 
can be traced to the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the progressive agenda in 
this area was not implemented in full, the legislation that it instigated would be the basis for 
campaign regulation in the United States until the early seventies. Additionally, the ideas 
advocated by the progressives would have an impact into the present and play a significant 
role in framing all future debates on campaign finance.  
This period saw a hugely significant principle enshrined in legislation, which was to 
have a vast long-term significance and set the American system apart from the model adopted 
in the UK. The Tillman Act of 1907 outlawed electoral contributions from corporations and 
banks. This legislation established a significant element of the American campaign finance 
system – namely, the rejection of institutional donations (Corrado, 1997: 27-28; Zardkoohi, 
1985). This principle was further extended in 1943, by the War Labor Disputes Act, which 
imposed an electoral contributions ban on trade unions, similar to that which the Tillman Act 
had imposed on corporations (this measure was originally intended to last until the end of the 
conflict, but was made permanent in 1946). Although both corporations and labor unions do 
play a significant role in the financial aspects of American political life through various 
institutional mechanisms, these two pieces of legislation ensured that they were expressly 
excluded from giving directly to candidates and parties, which establishes a vast and 
significant distinction from the UK. 
The Federal Election Campaign Act era. 
The desire to regulate campaign finance in the United States in the latter part of the 
twentieth century was driven by both social and technological change. Perhaps the most 
obvious factor influencing the evolution of campaign finance in the immediate post-war 
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period was the erosion of the city-based party machines. These organizations had once been 
central to electoral power-broking and fundraising. However, by the late sixties the city 
machine was near to extinct, destroyed by societal change and the evolution of American life. 
In the place of the machines and the parties, politics started to refocus on the candidates 
seeking office. Instructively for anyone studying the Internet, at least one element of this 
change was technological in nature. The rise of television led to a far greater focus on the 
candidate and a hugely increased role for advertising in election campaigning. As a result, 
electoral costs were spiraling by the late sixties. There was a fifty per cent increase in election 
expenditure between 1964 and 1968 alone (Alexander, 1992: 88). However, candidates, 
deprived of the fundraising capabilities of effective party machines, struggled to meet the 
demands created by the evolving electoral environment. 
The response to this problem was legislative, and took the form of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971. The Act essentially contained three elements: it 
limited the amount of personal wealth candidates could contribute to their own campaign; it 
created a requirement for full and publicly available disclosure of election receipts and 
expenses, and, in response to the rising cost of publicity, it established specific limits on 
media expenditure – defined as radio, television, newspapers, magazine, and automated 
telephone systems (Corrado, 1997: 29 and 52; Sorauf, 1992: 7-9). This latter element of the 
bill had two distinct parts – firstly, the candidates could only spend $50,000 or $0.10 per 
eligible voter in an election, whichever was the greater amount. Additionally, a maximum of 
60 per cent of a candidate’s total expenditure could be used to purchase television or radio 
advertising. These regulations were to cover the entire period of the primary and the general 
election, as well as any runoff or special elections.  
 
  
Campaign Finance in the US and the UK Page 18 of 45
The Federal Election Campaign Act was never intended as a radical document. 
Rather, it was designed to retain the principles established in the pre-existing regulation, but 
to update them for the televisual, candidate-centered age. However, the Act was only to be 
used in one election. Events were very soon to take a dramatic twist and irrevocably alter the 
campaign finance landscape in the United States. The Watergate scandal and the fact that the 
investigation into Nixon’s wrongdoings had led to serious concerns about the propriety of his 
campaign’s sources of income, made far more radical reforms politically viable. The end 
result of this was the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment (FECA) of 1974. This has 
been seen as the most significant piece of campaign finance legislation ever passed in the US 
(Corrado, 1997: 32 and 53; Sorauf, 1992: 7-9). This claim is not without justification. Not 
only did it seek to fix the problems that its proponents argued were evident in the old regime, 
and add extra requirements and restrictions; it also sought to enshrine certain values – in 
particular a preference for small donors over large givers – into the regulatory framework. 
Broadly, the amended FECA regime can be divided into four elements: reporting 
requirements, spending caps, donations caps and public subsidy.  
Reporting requirements were tightened considerably under the Act. The format of 
accounts was standardized and time limits were imposed to ensure their prompt submission, 
while candidates were required to create a single committee, through which all their finances 
must be managed (in the past it had been perfectly possible for candidates to funnel monies 
through multiple committees). Most crucially of all, a new bipartisan body – the Federal 
Election Commission (the FEC) – was established to gather and hold this data, and enforce 
campaign finance regulations. The FEC was to have genuine power to hold candidates to 
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account and to punish wrongdoing. Indeed, the creation of the FEC gave the United States the 
largest campaign finance bureaucracy system in the world (Sorauf, 1992: 9).  
The media-based spending caps of the 1971 Act were replaced with total expenditure 
caps, which applied to all federal elections. In Senate contests, the total expenditure per 
candidate was permitted to be the greater sum of $100,000 or $0.08 per voting-age member of 
the population for the primary election, and then the greater amount of $150,000 or $0.12 per 
voting age citizen in the general election. For House candidates, the limit was set at the 
greater sum of $150,000 or $0.12 in each cycle. Expenditure in presidential elections was also 
capped, with simple limits - $10m for the primary contest and $20m for the general election. 
All of the ceilings were indexed to inflation. Additionally, candidates were allowed to spend 
an extra 20 per cent of their budget total on fundraising.  
The reason for this last provision was that the Act also imposed limits on donation, 
and it was appreciated that, now having to rely on smaller donations, candidates would have 
to use greater amounts of energy and resources to increase the number of people in their 
fundraising base. The amendment Act retained the 1971 Act’s limits on contributions by 
candidates to their own campaigns, as well as capping all other donations. Individuals were 
permitted to give a maximum of $1000 to a campaign for any primary, runoff or election. An 
individual was limited to a total of $25,000 electoral contributions per annum. Furthermore, 
Political Action Committee contributions were capped at $5,000 per campaign per year.  
Finally, and perhaps most ground-breaking of all, the Act introduced public funding 
for presidential elections. This funding took two forms. The general election itself was funded 
by a simple grant of $20m, index linked to inflation. This money was, realistically, available 
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to candidates from the two major parties, as the ability to gain full-funds was derived from 
performance during previous elections. However, the grant was only given on the condition 
that there were no attempts to raise private money for campaigning. The public funding 
arrangements for the primary competition was more complex, and were based on the principle 
of the public purse matching funds raised by the candidates from small contributors. In order 
to qualify, candidates had to raise $5,000 in contributions of less than $250 in at least twenty 
states. If these criteria were met, the government would match, dollar-for-dollar, the first $250 
of each donation made to candidates. Candidates could claim up to $5m in this way – that is, 
half of their spending limit. The logic of the regulation was clear. Spending limits and public 
finance were conceived to function in tandem, with the maximum public funding available 
being related to the overall spending limit in the primary competition. The aim of the public 
subsidy was to encourage candidate to gather their contributions in small donations, which 
were regarded as preferable to large contributions.  
How candidates would have adapted to the stringent regulatory framework 
established by FECA in its 1974 form is one of the great “what if?” questions of American 
politics. The Act was never used in the form it was drafted in a presidential election cycle. 
The reason for this was that some of its most significant elements were deemed 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Buckley vs. Valeo (US Supreme Court, 1976), a 
ruling which Sarauf argues “gutted” FECA (Sorauf, 1992: 211). Firstly, spending caps were 
deemed unconstitutional, on the grounds that they impinged the First Amendment, which 
guaranteed freedom of speech. As importantly, the ruling rejected the definition of electoral 
campaign spending used in FECA, which was expenditure designed to influence elections. 
This, the Supreme Court argued, was too vague and would actually discourage people from 
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engaging in political activity that should be legal and protected by the constitution. Instead, 
the Supreme Court suggested a definition of “express advocacy”, where the use of certain 
“magic words”, such as “vote”, and “elect” would be used to indicate electoral campaigning 
(Malbin, 2006a: 5).  
However, even in its modified form, FECA was powerful enough to dramatically 
alter the fundraising methods employed by the parties. Two strategies are worthy of particular 
note: direct mail campaigns and bundling. As they were unable to raise large sums from 
individual donations, candidates and parties were forced to do a great deal of work developing 
the technology and infrastructure to undertake massive direct mailing operations. As a result, 
campaigns became adept at tailoring their message to individual voters, hoping to entice them 
to make political contributions (Adamany, 1986; Berman, 1986). Secondly, to cope with the 
newly introduced donation limits, parties encouraged supporters to “bundle” contributions. 
Essentially, this required prominent and powerful individuals – often businessmen and 
women, or campaigners – to construct a network amongst their professional, political and 
social acquaintances, all of whom would give donations to a political candidate or party. 
Thus, completely legally, a single individual could marshal and organize donations running 
into tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars (Sorauf, 1992: 52-53, 124-130). This 
practice continues today. In the 2000 Presidential election, George Bush deemed activists who 
were able to bundle more than $100,000 for his campaign as “Pioneers”. In the 2004 election 
he created two new categories – “Rangers” who each bundled $200,000 and “Super-Rangers” 
who each bundled $300,000 (Drinkard & McQuillan, 2003). In 2007, 233 Hillary Clinton 
bundlers who each raised more than $100,000 were dubbed “Hillraisers” (Kirkpatrick, 2007).  
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The FECA period still offers much of the fundamental framework of the American 
campaign finance regime. Perhaps, most importantly though, it illustrated the power of the 
Supreme Court, and made the constitutional doctrine that campaign expenditure is equated to 
free speech a political orthodoxy. As a result, the idea of Congress legislating to impose 
spending caps on candidates in elections became unthinkable, short of a constitutional 
amendment. Given the great difficulty, illustrated throughout the history of campaign finance 
reform, of creating even a simple majority for change, this is nearly impossible to imagine.  
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act: reform revisited. 
By the mid-nineties, even judged against the limited regulatory framework offered 
by the post-Buckley vs.Valeo incarnation of FECA, the regulatory system was failing. The 
reason for this was a loophole constructed from two elements of the original legislation. 
Firstly, the Act allowed for unlimited sums of money to be given to state parties for 
organizational developmental. The original logic behind this clause was that parties were a 
vital element in civic society, and that to deprive them of funds would prevent them fulfilling 
their role as mobilizes and educators of the electorate. However, by the nineties, party 
strategists had started to link this provision with the “express advocacy” test laid out by the 
Supreme Court. This reading of the law gave parties the ability to spend vast sums of money 
on election campaigns without breaking any rules (Franz et al., 2006: 143-144; Malbin, 
2006b: 6). This situation created a paradox – the weaknesses of FECA, once lauded as the 
most radical campaign finance reform Act passed in American history, had, by the mid-
nineties, been exploited to such an extent that the regulatory regime had been completely 
undermined. The parties were now able to gather unlimited “soft money” contributions (that 
 
  
Campaign Finance in the US and the UK Page 23 of 45
is, donations that are given and spent outside the regulatory environment) from individuals, 
corporations and trade unions. 
The dramatic failure of the FECA regime in this respect and runaway soft-money 
donations to parties led to renewed calls for reform (Malbin, 2006b: 6). The Bi-Partisan 
Campaign Finance Act, sometimes referred to by the name of its co-sponsors, Senators John 
McCain and Russ Feingold, was, in many ways, an attempt to re-establish a fundamental 
principles of the 1974 Act – namely that contributions to both candidates and parties should 
be regulated and limited. In trying to achieve this goal, McCain-Feingold gave with one hand 
and took with the other. In the debit column, it prevented parties from harvesting “soft 
contributions” for campaigning in Federal Elections. As a result of this measure, parties were 
deeply fearful of a financial shortfall that they would be unable to make up in “hard money” 
contributions – that is, donations that are regulated by federal law. To counteract this fear, 
BCRA increased federal donation caps, which had remained unchanged since 1974 (indeed, 
since the limits imposed by FECA were not indexed to prices, donations caps had been 
declining in size in real terms). It was widely predicted that both candidates and parties could 
hope to raise greater sums from individual donors who had the resources to give to the legal 
maximum than had been the case in previous election cycles. However, this did not placate 
everyone. Many still claimed that parties, denied access to soft money, would still be unable 
to make up the short-fall in their funds (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000; Malbin, 2006b: 1-4).  
In many ways, the development of the Internet as a serious fundraising tool and the 
impact of BPCR were contemporaneous. As well as arguably being the first online election, 
2004 was also the first BPCR election. Simultaneously to both of these developments, 
campaign fundraising in American politics has massively increased, both in rate and scale, as 
 
  
Campaign Finance in the US and the UK Page 24 of 45
evidenced by the 2004 and 2008 presidential contests. Arguably, BPCR’s central objective – 
to empower individual donors and undermine soft money – is perfectly aligned with the 
potential of the Internet.    
The Development of the Campaign Finance System in the UK 
Historically, the impulse to reform campaign finance has played a far lesser role in 
British political discourse than it has on the other side of the Atlantic. Certainly the United 
Kingdom has taken a far more laissez faire stand to campaign finance (Fisher & Clift, 2004: 
677). This approach is evidenced by the late development of public reporting of political 
donations and expenditure, for example. The US has aspired to transparency since the early 
twentieth century and now has the most effective reporting system of anywhere in the world. 
The UK only got such an arrangement in 2000, and even then, it collated far less information 
than the American model.  
This is not to suggest that campaign finance has not been discussed and solutions 
proposed to perceived problems. Two recurring issues are cited with political finance in 
Britain. Firstly, it is argued that parties are perennially short of necessary financial resources, 
to the extent that they are unable to fulfill their civic role (Phillips, 2007: 1-2). Secondly, it is 
claimed that political financial scandals, such as the so-called cash for honors affair in 2006-
2007 or Peter Hain’s failure to adequately report donations to his deputy leadership campaign 
in 2007 undermine the public’s confidence in the political classes (BBC Online, 2007; Grice, 
2008). Despite this though, the issue has never gained the same ideological charge that it 
carries in the United States, possibly because the terms of the debate are so fixed in 
longstanding political arrangements. However, two significant pieces of legislation stand out 
as having particular impact.  
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Regulating the constituencies. 
The Illegal and Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act of 1883 was, for nearly 120 years, 
albeit with some amendment, the single most important piece of legislation concerning 
campaign finance regulation on the British statute books, and still provides the foundations 
for a significant proportion of the regulatory framework in place. The Act was drafted in the 
aftermath of the 1880 election. In modern British politics, there is much talk of “run-away” 
election expenditure. However, in real terms, the 1880 election is probably the most 
expensive ever fought, costing £2.5 million. At 2005 values, that amounts to more than £165 
million (figure derived from Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981: 28). The actual 2005 election cost the 
three major parties just over £40 million (Electoral Commission, 2006). The profligate 
expenditure during this period of British politics can be explained by the interaction of two 
distinct circumstances. Firstly, elections occurred within a completely unregulated campaign 
finance system. Secondly, the latter half of the nineteenth century saw a huge increase in 
political competitiveness across the country, fuelled by the rise of political parties and the 
extension of the franchise. Fifty years before, many seats would have been uncontested, 
keeping costs down. By 1880, only seventeen per cent of seats were uncontested (Pinto-
Dushinsky, 1981: 28). Clearly this funding situation was not sustainable in the long term.    
The result of these events was the 1883 Act, which directly addressed the issue of 
expanding expenditure by imposing limits on candidate’s campaign spending in the 
constituency where they were running. To ensure these limits were adhered to, the Act also 
made the appointment of an electoral agent, with responsibility for recording and reporting 
campaign donations and expenditure, compulsory (Linton, 1994: 5-6). Measured by overall 
election expenditure, the Act was a success. The 1885 election cost a third less than the 1880 
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contest. The cost of elections – in real terms – was never again to reach the extremes of spring 
1880.  
This Victorian attempt at regulating British political finance enshrined a very 
fundamental and recurring principle, which significantly differentiated British rules from 
those in the United States. While American legislators found it near-impossible to introduce 
spending caps, the 1883 Act proved that, within a British political framework, such spending 
limits were practicable, effective, and persistent. The modern version of this idea was laid out 
in the Representation of the People Act (1983), which legislated that spending limits should 
broadly go up in line with inflation, with precise recommendations for the caps being made by 
the Electoral Commission. The tool for doing this would be a two stage formula, combining a 
universally applied constituency spending cap and a sum of money per voter living in the 
electoral unit. In the 2005 general election, the flat spending limit was £7,150 per 
constituency, plus an additional 5 pence per voter in more urban, borough constituencies or 7 
pence per voter in more rural, county constituencies (Garner & Kelly, 1998: 2 and 6). Such 
restrictions would be unthinkable in the US.  
Despite the success of the 1883 legislation, at least on its own terms, changes to the 
regime governing the financial aspects of politics were limited throughout the twentieth 
century. The Illegal and Corrupt Practices (Prevention) Act has been modified since it was 
originally passed by subsequent pieces of legislation, drafted in response to specific 
circumstances. For example, the original Act did not regulate non-candidates in an election 
who might campaign against people running for office, a loophole exploited by the 
suffragettes. The 1918 Representation of the People Act rectified this situation, making it 
illegal to campaign against candidates (Linton, 1994: 6). However, major reform, and in 
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particular any kind of regulation at the national level, looked unlikely to occur, as any 
suggestions seemed to advantage or disadvantage of one of the major parties. In 1929, Labour 
proposed an Electoral Reform Act containing measures that would have greatly disadvantaged 
the Conservatives, who, in response, proposed a set of reforms that would have hurt Labour. 
Ultimately no changes occurred. Likewise, in 1974, Labour established the Houghton 
Committee, which, two years later, stated it was in favor of state aid for political parties. 
However, Labour’s loss of power in 1979 prevented this policy being instigated.  
PPERA: time for national regulation? 
The deadlock in campaign finance legislation was broken by the Labour Party’s 
electoral victory in 1997. In part, this victory was achieved on the back of concern about 
standards in public life during the previous Conservative government’s tenure, with so-called 
“sleaze” scandals proving to be highly damaging. This concern was further enhanced by 
Labour’s own party funding scandal, involving a donation from Formula One Supremo 
Bernie Eccelston and a decision to exempt motor racing from a proposed ban on tobacco 
advertising (Scarrow, 2004: 668). 
These events resulted in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendum Act (2000). 
This piece of legislation would address what had become the major weakness of the existing 
regulatory framework. At the time the 1883 Act was passed, the primary concern of 
lawmakers was local politics, being fought out in the constituencies. However, over the 
following decades, political power and resources became increasingly centralized, and 
national parties grew hugely in significance. This is not to suggest that local campaigning and 
fundraising became wholly insignificant (on this issue, see Johnson & Pattie, 2007). However, 
it is clear that expansion of central parties, coupled with the deadlock in the reform process, 
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left a significant – and, throughout the twentieth century, expanding – proportion of political 
life almost completely unregulated and lacking in transparency of any kind (Grant, 2005: 
381).  
PPERA has been termed the most dramatic development in British campaign finance 
regulation since the 1883 Act (Fisher, 2002: 1). The Act established the first national 
campaign spending limits, which were calculated based on the number of seats that a party 
was running in. In 2005, this limit was set at £30,000 for every constituency a party was 
contesting. As a result, the maximum potential expenditure was some £18.8 million (Garner 
& Kelly, 1998: 6). Additionally, it modestly increased the level of state funding available to 
political actors seeking office, and clarified the role to be played by third-party actors in 
electoral competition. Finally, the Act instigated the first national reporting criteria, wherein 
parties would have to notify the Electoral Commission of their income and expenditure in 
quarterly reports. They would also have to provide more detailed and frequent information 
during an election period (HM Government, 2000).  
However, PPERA is as interesting for what it did not include. Two particular 
omissions stand out as being significant. Firstly, the Neill committee, around whose proposals 
PPERA was originally drafted, recommended a system of matching funds from the public 
purse for small donations. This was rejected by the government as being too expensive and 
because it was claimed such a measure would amount to public funding via the backdoor. 
More cynically, it has been argued that this rejection in fact occurred because Labour would 
do less well out of such a system than would their opponents (Grant, 2005: 381-382).  
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The second significant omission in PPERA was the lack of any attempt at instigating 
donation caps, despite the fact that a number of huge donations to both major parties have 
been a source of some public concern, especially in the period before general elections. 
However, it is also important to note just how reliant political parties are on large donations, 
either from individuals and organizations. It has been estimated that a cap on donations in the 
United Kingdom of £5000 (roughly equal to five times the increased BPCR cap imposed in 
the US) would deprive parties of 90 per cent of their current income (Grant, 2005: 390). This 
is particularly true of individual donations, which have grown in significance as parties’ 
traditional sources of income – most notably, membership subscriptions and, in the case of 
Labour, trade union levies – have declined.        
More generally (and although PPERA is undoubtedly a break from the past and the 
United Kingdom’s laissez faire approach to campaign finance), PPERA, unlike BPCR, did 
nothing to attack any streams of revenue on which the parties had come to rely – not 
individual donors, corporations or trade unions. As a result the system PPERA instigated did 
not create the same level of disruption to the campaign finance system in the UK as did BPCR 
to the American system, and parties were not required to rethink or hugely alter their political 
fundraising strategies. The essential elements of the campaign finance system remained 
undisturbed. Additionally, by not including the possibility of matching public monies for 
small donors, the Act did not encourage parties to look for new and potentially lucrative 
sources of revenue from large numbers of citizens giving small amounts of money.  
American and British campaign finance regulation and the Internet 
This regulatory history leads us to a number of broad conclusions about the 
fundamental differences between the British and American campaign finance systems, all of 
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which have played a role in shaping the nature of online fundraising in the two countries. 
Broadly, we can focus on three distinctions, which encourage online fundraising in the US 
and discourage it in the UK: differing attitudes to institutional and individual giving; the 
American reliance on donation caps in comparison with the British tradition of spending caps; 
and the lack of any kind of systematic public funding in the United Kingdom. 
The rejection of institutional funding by Americans occurred very early in the 
progressive period. Although the legislation is far from fully effective, and PACs and soft 
money loopholes still allowed for such donations, there is a far greater cultural antipathy in 
American politics to institutional giving. In contrast, both major British parties relied on 
institutional donations for the most part of the twentieth century, to the extent that the process 
became enshrined in the party system. It continues to make up a significant element of party 
income today. In summer 2007, for example, when it was suspected that Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown was going to call an early election, a number of trade union leaders were able 
to offer a pledge that they would finance the campaign if it were required (BBC Online, 
2007). American law would simply not permit such a statement. Instead, American politicians 
largely have to rely on individual donors giving money to their campaigns. Furthermore, both 
FECA and BPCR have enshrined this principle in legislation. Clearly, this form of giving is 
much more conducive to the use of the Internet. In contrast, in the British example, the 
technology is largely superfluous to the fundraising requirements of parties.  
The same can be said of the large individual donations that are available to parties in 
the United Kingdom. Such donations, which have run into millions of pounds, negate the 
need to use the Internet. When parties are able and legally allowed to raise such huge sums of 
money from an individual, then Internet campaigning becomes, with its requirement to 
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expend energy and resources reaching out to vast numbers of small donors, a relatively less 
attractive option. In the US, even “large donors” contributing to candidates (and, since BPCR, 
to parties) still give a relatively modest sum, capped at $2000 and linked to inflation by the 
2002 legislation. It is still conceivable to imagine such sums being given over the Internet. It 
is certainly likely that smaller sums – the so-called $50 donations – are given online. Even if 
the extent and significance of these contributions is perhaps not as one-sided as it has been 
presented, it is undoubtedly the case that they have an expanded role in American politics, and 
the Internet is playing a part, and probably a decisive one, in creating this situation.  
Although the impact of the Act is hard to quantify, it seems likely that the rise of 
small dollar online giving in the United States has also been catalyzed by the implementation 
of BPCR. Parties have not completely renounced soft money, but have instead found 
alternative mechanisms for deploying these donations, most infamously 527 groups (so-
termed because of the code in the US tax statute that regulates them). Although these 
organizations are in theory completely separate from political parties, they are in reality 
closely linked, especially through the people they employ (Boatright, 2007; Weissman & 
Hassan, 2006). However, the post-BPCR period has also seen massively increased hard 
money giving, the growing significance of individual donors, and an increase in small dollar 
giving. By this measure, the Act has certainly achieved many of its aims, aided by the 
development of the Internet.  
The tradition of donation limits as the primary regulatory tool in the US has had 
other significant impacts. Post-FECA, the strategies that parties and candidates developed in 
order to respond to only being able to gather limited donations from individuals have also 
helped them adapt to the Internet age. Direct mail ensured that American campaigns became 
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very effective at managing and organizing information and using computer technology. 
Additionally, direct mail taught fundraisers to develop a relationship with individual 
contributors and tailor their messages toward them. This is something that has been replicated 
online (Howard, 2006: 1-2). Bundling, albeit on a narrow and exclusive scale, pointed 
towards the power of networked funding, as it relied on individuals, who were acting with a 
measure of independence from campaigns in order to raise funds. In many ways, that model 
can be seen as a primitive version of the technique that was to be employed by bloggers and 
online activists. 
In contrast, the British regulatory approach of employing spending caps, first in the 
constituencies and more recently nationally, seems to have stunted the need of parties to 
develop alternative sources of revenue. This is primarily because it prevents a campaign 
finance “arms race” of the sort seen in the US. British politicians from major parties have 
little fear that their opponents will be able to out fundraise them. In the lexicon of Katz and 
Mair, the system is cartelized by spending limits, which reduces the level of competition 
massively (Katz & Mair, 1995). While UK parties will always aspire to generate extra 
income, this regulatory framework ensures that they lack the same level of motivation as their 
US counterparts.  
Finally, a system of matching funds, as created by FECA in the US, will do much to 
encourage candidates to seek small donations, as it effectively increases their relative value 
via the public purse. The lack of any such incentive in the United Kingdom ensures that small 
donations are not favored over larger contributions. However, it should also be noted that the 
American matching funds system in the primary season is now in some difficulties (Malbin, 
2006a). In particular, the rising level of campaign fundraising has made it possible for certain 
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particularly successful candidates to opt out of matching funds and, as a result, the spending 
limits it imposes on them. This was first apparent in the 2000 presidential election, when 
George Bush chose not to take public support. John Kerry and Howard Dean then followed 
this approach in the 2004 contest.  
This is the perhaps the clearest example of the technology-institutional arrangement 
dialectic at work. While various institutions have made the Internet a powerful tool for 
American politicians, the very success of online fundraising is dismantling some elements of 
the American campaign finance system. It is now questionable whether a candidate can 
actually accept public funds and still be considered a serious contender for the nomination. 
Short of full scale reform, the public funding element of the presidential primary system 
seems like it is now a defunct institution. Furthermore, these developments look set to 
continue: it now seems that the fundraising prowess of certain candidates will soon endanger 
public funding for the presidential election itself (Washington Post, 2008).   
Conclusion 
The above discussion seems to point to a very complex relationship between, on the 
one hand, pre-existing political arrangements, norms and regulations, and, on the other hand, 
the technological affordances of the Internet. If examined in isolation, the experience of the 
United States and the dramatic changes seemingly being wrought by the net might seem to 
suggest the optimists were correct – the Internet is reforming political institutions, at least in 
the arena of campaign finance. However, such an approach negates the role played by the 
same institutions and norms in facilitating those changes in the first place.  
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In part, explanations for the success of online fundraising in the US can be found in 
the realm of political ideas, and in particular the positive view the American population takes 
of civic volunteerism and the progressive tradition. Additionally, the regulatory framework 
constructed in the US over the past century, culminating in BPCR in 2002, has created a 
situation where political actors have both the opportunity and motivation to develop their 
capabilities as online fundraisers. Especially since the 2000 election cycle, this has created a 
financial “arms race”, where office seekers have attempted to out raise each other in order to 
remain politically viable. This process has reached its dramatic conclusion (at least thus far) in 
the Democratic primary contest, with candidates raising sums of money which would have 
seemed unimaginable only a few years ago.  
The complex relationship between technology and political institutions is further 
demonstrated by the experience of the United Kingdom. In Britain, it seems that both 
institutional norms and regulations have conspired to undermine the potential of the Internet 
as a fundraising tool. Parties have had little opportunity and limited incentive to change their 
existing revenue streams in recent decades. They are still able to rely on large donation, from 
individuals, unions or corporations. Although Britain has recently seen a significant piece of 
campaign finance legislation passed, PPERA has, by failing to limit large donations or 
incentivize small giving, not created the same disruption of pre-existing revenue streams that 
BPCR did in the US. Furthermore, the imposition of a national spending cap under the Act 
may actually ensure that the funding arrangements employed by British parties become 
cartelized, preventing a funding arms race and limiting competitive pressures within the party 
system which might drive the development of an effective Internet donation base. 
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It is important to appreciate that the political traditions and regulatory frameworks in 
both countries will continue to impact the future of campaign finance, and it is unlikely that 
the patterns of path dependency will be broken. For example, it is no coincidence that while 
there is concern in Britain about the funding of political parties, there are few advocates of an 
Internet driven, American-style small dollar revolution. Instead the default position of British 
reformers has tended to be the advocacy of the European model of state funding (for example 
Linton, 1994; Power Commission, 2006). However, any such proposal, where it ever to be 
instigated, would, by abetting the process of cartelization between the parties and making 
small individual donations less significant, be likely to bolster many of the existing 
characteristics of the British campaign finance settlement, rather than offset them. As a result, 
it is not only the case that Internet fundraising is currently less relevant in the UK than in the 
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